Article
21 of the Civil Code
This is an appeal by certiorari. On October
27, 1987, without the assistance of counsel, private respondent filed with the
aforesaid trial court a complaint for damages against petitioner for the
alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said
complaint that she is 20 years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good
moral character and reputation duly respected in her country; other petitioner,
on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at Lozano Apartments, Guilig,
Dagupan City, and is an exchange student, before August 20, 1987 the latter
courted and proposed to marry her, she accepted his love on the condition that
they get married; they therefore agreed to get married. The petitioner forced
her to live with him in the Lozano apartments. She was a virgin at that time;
after a week before the filing of complaint, petitioner’s attitude towards her
started to change. He maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of the
complaint. Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and asked her not to
live with him anymore and that the petitioner is already married to someone in
Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering petitioner
to pay her damages. On the other hand, petitioner claimed that he never
proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent and
denied all allegations against him. After trial on the merits, the lower court
ordered petitioner to pay the private respondent damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not
Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar.
HELD: The existing rule is
that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.
Notwithstanding, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concepts of torts
and quasi-delicts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for
the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. Article 2176 of the
Civil Code, which defines quasi-delicts thus:
“Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.”
In the light of the above laudable purpose
of Article 21, the court held that where a man’s promise to marry in fact the
proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation
to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of
herself unto him in sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no
intention of marrying her and that the promise was only subtle scheme or
deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and obtain her consent
to sexual act could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not
because of such breach of promise of marriage but because of the fraud and
deceit behind it, and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed
thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury should have been
committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy.
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