MARCOS V. MARCOS

Facts

Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had five children. Alleging that the husband failed to provide material support to the family and have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the marriage for psychological incapacity. The RTC declared the marriage null and void under Art. 36 which was however reversed by CA. 

Issues

Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the respondent by a physician is a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. 

Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity. 

Held

Psychological incapacity as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however that the respondent be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such declaration. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his “defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home. Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver. In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of the petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurabilty and for her failure to observe the guidelines as outline in Republic v. CA and Molina.

REPUBLIC VS. DAGDAG 351 SCRA 425

FACTS:

On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20 years old, at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. The marriage certificate was issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of on October 20, 1988. Erlinda and Avelino begot two children. The birth certificates were issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija also on October 20, 1988. A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear for months, suddenly re-appear for a few months, and then disappear again. During the times when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends and would return home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical injuries to her.

In October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last that they heard from him. Erlinda learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime, and that he escaped from jail and remains at large to-date. In July 1990, Erlinda filed with the RTC of Olongapo City a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since Avelino could not be located, summons was served by publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of general circulation. On the date set for presentation of evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her sister-in-law as her only witness.

The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating prosecutor until January 2, 1991 to manifest in writing whether or not he would present controverting evidence, and stating that should he fail to file said manifestation, the case would be deemed submitted for decision. The Investigating Prosecutor conducted an investigation and found that there was no collusion between the parties. 

However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of evidence. Without waiting for the investigating prosecutor’s manifestation, the trial court declared the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void under Article 36. The investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the ground that the decision was prematurely rendered since he was given until January 2, 1991 to manifest whether he was presenting controverting evidence. The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the same is not in accordance with the evidence and the law. Since the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court holding that “Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to perform the duties and obligations of a married person but because he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal.”

ISSUE:

Did the CA correctly declare the marriage as null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, on the ground that the husband suffers from psychological incapacity, as he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from justice?

HELD:

Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on “all fours” with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.

In REPUBLIC VS. MOLINA (268 SCRA 198), the Court laid down the GUIDELINES in the interpretation of Article 36 of the Family Code.

Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the above-mentioned evidentiary requirements. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline number 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Further, the allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which he was arrested was not even alleged. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence since the trial court’s decision was prematurely rendered.

Republic vs. Nolasco 220 SCRA 20

 FACTS:

Gregorio Nolasco is a seaman.  He met Janet Parker, a British, in bar in England.  After that, Janet started living with Nolasco in his ship for six months.  It lasted until the contract of Nolasco expired then he brought her to his hometown in Antique.  They got married in January 1982.  Due to another contract, Nolasco left the province.  In 1983, Nolasco received a letter from his mother informing him that his son had been born but 15 days after, Janet left.  Nolasco went home and cut short his contract to find Janet’s whereabouts.  He did so by securing another seaman’s contract going to London.  He wrote several letters to the bar where they first met but it was all returned.  Gregorio petitioned in 1988 for a declaration of presumptive death of Janet. 

ISSUE: Whether or not Nolasco had a well-founded belief that his wife, Janet, is already dead?

HELD: 

The Supreme Court ruled that Nolasco’s efforts to locate Janet were not persistent to show that he has a well-founded belief that his wife was already dead because instead of seeking assistance of local authorities and the British Embassy, he even secured another contract.  More so, while he was in London, he did not even try to solicit help of the authorities to find his wife.

Republic vs. Court of Appeals

The facts:

On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro’s parents. The marriage contract states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila. The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant that the couple decided to live together. Their cohabitation only lasted for four months and then the couple parted ways. The baby was adopted by Castro’s brother, with the consent of Cardenas. It was then discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage as confirmed by a certification from the Civil Register of Pasig, Metro Manila. Her husband was duly served with notice of the proceedings and a copy of the petition but he chose to ignore it, thus, he was properly declared in default. The trial court denied her petition on the ground that the certification was inadequate to establish the alleged non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage of the contracting parties. The appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines now assailed the decision of the appellate court and posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of due search and inability to find a record or entry to the effect that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued to the parties is not adequate to prove its non-issuance. 

The Issue:

Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the marriage or private respondent to Edwin Cardenas?

Held:

The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a “secret marriage”, ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of the contracting parties. At the time the marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was the New Civil Code which provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio. 

The certification of due search and inability to find issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to section 29, rule 132 of the rules of court, a certificate of due search and inability to find sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties. There was absolutely no evidence on record to show that there was collusion between private respondent and her husband Cardenas. It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that the marriage between the contracting parties is null and void for lack of marriage license does not discount that fact that indeed, a spurious marriage license, purporting to be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, may have been presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer.

This court holds that under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license. The petition is Denied there being no showing of any reversible error committed by respondent appellate court.

Martinez vs. Martinez G.R. No. 162084 June 28, 2005

Facts: The spouses Martinez were the owners of a parcel of land as well as the house constructed thereon. Daniel, Sr. executed a Last Will and Testament directing the subdivision of the property into three lots. He then bequeathed the three lots to each of his sons, namely, Rodolfo, Manolo and Daniel, Jr. Manolo was designated as the administrator of the estate. 

Rodolfo found a deed of sale purportedly signed by his father, where the latter appears to have sold to Manolo and his wife Lucila. Rodolfo filed a complaint for annulment of deed of sale and cancellation of TCT against his brother Manolo and his sister-in-law Lucila before the RTC. RTC dismissed the complaint for annulment of deed of sale on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the action since there was no allegation in the complaint that the last will of Daniel Martinez, Sr. had been admitted to probate. Rodolfo appealed the order to the CA. 

In the meantime, the spouses Manolo and Lucila Martinez wrote Rodolfo, demanding that he vacate the property. Rodolfo ignored the letter and refused to do so. This prompted the said spouses to file a complaint for unlawful detainer against Rodolfo in the MTC of Manila. They alleged that they were the owners of the property. The spouses Martinez alleged in their position paper that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made and/or exerted by them, but that the same proved futile. No amicable settlement was, likewise, reached by the parties during the preliminary conference because of irreconcilable differences. 

Issue: Whether or not the certification to file action and the allegations in the complaint that the case passed through the barangay are sufficient compliance to prove that earnest efforts were made. 

Ruling: The petition was granted. As pointed out by the Code Commission, it is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a compromise before litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family and it is known that a lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers. 

Thus, a party’s failure to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code before filing a complaint against a family member would render such complaint premature.

Director of Lands v. Abelardo

Facts: The case revolves around proving the ownership of 2 parcels of lands, which were properties subject in a successional litigation.  Siblings Fulgencia and Jose Dino are contesting the ownership of subject properties in Manuel Libunao’s possession.  They further claim that as deaf-mutes, they should not be barred by prescription in filing the case.

Issue: Whether or not the prescription period in filing the case should be relaxed due to their being deaf-mutes.

Held: No, they are not.  The SC ruled that the subject lands are still and should still be owned by Manuel Libuano and family due to the following reasons (1) the preponderance of evidence as to the ownership of the lands are in favor of Libunao, (2) the action for filing a claim regarding the partition of the estate has already prescribed.

Being a deaf-mute is not by itself alone, without the concurrence of any of the incapacities recognized by law, considered included among the exceptions which in matters of prescription, are granted to incapacitated persons, in connection with the running of the prescriptive period.

People v. Sasota

Facts: Defendant was charged with the crime of rape of a deaf and dumb girl.  Sasota, found guilty of the crime because of the victim’s testimony, now posits that the testimony of the deaf and dumb should not have been accepted by the court at its full value.

Issue: Whether or not a deaf and dumb person is considered a competent witness by the court.

Held: There is no merit in the contention of the defendant that deaf and dumb persons are to be considered incompetent witnesses.  Though formerly, deaf and dump persons were considered incompetent, experience and observation have shown conclusively that the mere fact that a person is deaf and dumb is not sufficient to justify the finding that he is incompetent as a witness.  When such a witness is produced, the court may ascertain whether he has the requisite intelligence, and the judge will allow the witness to adopt such mode of communicating his ideas, whether by signs or writing as he deems most satisfactory.

US v. Vaquilar (Killing his Wife and Daughter)

Facts: 

Evaristo Vaquilar was found guilty of killing his wife and his daughter, as well as injuring other persons with a bolo.  Eyewitnesses testified that the defendant appeared to be insane prior to the commission of the crimes.  They also testified that the appellant was complaining of pains in his head and stomach prior to the killing. The witnesses’ evidence for insanity include:

•        “appellants eyes were very big and red with his sight penetrating at the time he was killing his wife.”

•        “he looked at me he was crazy because if he was not, he wouldn’t have killed his family”

•        at the moment of cutting those people, “he looked like a madman; crazy because he would cut anybody at random”

•        sister said, “…then he pursued me….he must have been crazy because he cut me”

Issue: 

Whether or not these pieces of evidence are sufficient to declare the accused as insane, therefore exempt from criminal liability.

Held: 

The evidence is insufficient to declare him insane.  The appellant’s conduct was consistent with the acts of an enraged criminal, not of a person with an unsound mind at the time he committed the crimes. The fact that a person acts crazy is not conclusive that he is insane.   The popular meaning of “crazy” is not synonymous with the legal terms “insane”.  The conduct of the appellant after he was confined in jail is not inconsistent with the actions of a sane person (not saying a word in the cell, crying out loud at night) who has reflected and felt remorse after the commission of the crime.

The court further held that mere mental depravity, or moral insanity which results not from any disease of the mind, but from  a perverted condition of the moral system where the person is mentally sane, does not exempt one from criminal responsibility.  In the absence of proof that the defendant had lost his reason or became demented after a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it is presumed that he was in a normal state of mind

Carillo vs. jaojaco (956 Phil. 46) March 24, 1925

Miguela Carrillo, as sister of deceased Adriana Carrillo and current administratrix of the latter’s estate, brought action to the CFI Cavite for the annulment of the document of because her sister was declared mentally incapacitated nine days after the transaction. The defendants were absolved from the complaint and from this judgment the plaintiff appealed.

Facts:

Nov. 13, 1918 – Adriana is confined in Hospital de San Juan de Dios for cerebral hemorrhage with hemiplegia. Marcos Jaojoco and his father Justiniano, defendant-appellees, nephew and brother-in-law, respectively to the deceased, were theones who took her to the hospital and cared for her. Dec. 18, 1918 – Adriana left the hospital and called a notary public to execute the sale of land (11 parcels of land in the barrio of Ulong-Tubig, municipality of Carmona, province of Cavite at the price of P4000) to Marcos Jaojoco. Nine days later, she dies and Miguela is appointed judicial administratrix of said estate. (It is interesting to note that Miguela was the surety of her sister when the latter acquired it from her husband in January 1917.)

Issue:

WON Adrian Carrillo was mentally incapacitated in executing the document of sale.

Held/Ratio:

No. The plaintiff’s attempt to prove that Adriana was mentally deranged was insufficient. Being confined in a hospital does not prove insanity. Her doctor testified that her sickness did not affect her head but only ½ of her body. Documents produced before the Court before the execution of the document of sale, shows complex tasks done by Adriana which couldn’t be done by a mentally incapacitated person

GELUZ v COURT OF APPEALS – ART 37, 40-47

FACTS:

 Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948 — through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion. It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz we granted certiorari.

 ISSUE:

Did the Plaintiff have the right for damages in behalf of his unborn child?

HELD:

No. The fetus was not yet born and thus does not have civil personality. According to Article 40, birth determines personality. In this case, the fetus does not yet possess a personality to speak of because it was aborted in uterus. The child should be born before the parents can seek any recovery for damages. Action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured. There could be no action for such damages that can be instituted on behalf of the unborn child for the injuries it received because it lacked juridical personality. The damages which the parents of an unborn child can recover are limited to moral damages, in this case, for the act of the appellant Geluz to perform the abortion. However, moral damages cannot also be recovered because the wife willingly sought the abortion, and the husband did not further investigate on the causes of the abortion. Furthermore, the husband did not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant, but was more concerned in obtaining from the doctor a large money payment.

Estrada vs. Escritor , 492 SCRA 1 ; 22 JUN 2006

FACTS: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with him as well. Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. 

Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act. 

Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.

RULING: No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition.

Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.

The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.

Liwayway Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco, Corp. (G.R. No. 141309, June 19, 2007)

FACTS:

This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code filed by Fortune against Liwayway as CIR.

On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be charged an ad valorem tax of “55% provided that the maximum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos per pack.” Prior to effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying “Champion,” “Hope,” and “More” (all manufactured by Fortune) as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these cigarette brands were already covered.

In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the issuance of the rule violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws.

For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent has no cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts. She also contended that the complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith.

The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to the CA, who dismissed the case on the ground that under Article 32, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad faith.

Hence this appeal.

ISSUES:

• Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in connection with the discharge of the functions of his/her office
• Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied instead of Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code

HELD:

On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person may suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks. An officer who acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its consent. However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.

Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil liability may arise where the subordinate public officer’s act is characterized by willfulness or negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.

Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in thecourse of the performance of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.

On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is Article 32, it being a special law, which prevails over ageneral law (the Administrative Code).

Article 32 was patterned after the “tort” in American law. A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which has been defined as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property or reputation. There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which the motive of the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine whether the act was wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of another’s legal right; that is, liability in tort in not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent.

UYPITCHING V. QUIAMCO 510 SCRA 172 (2007)

Honeste vivere, non alterum laedere et jus suum cuique tribuere.

To live virtuously, not to injure others and to give everyone his due. These supreme norms of justice are the underlying principles of law and order in society.

FACTS:

·          In 1982, respondent Quiamco was approached by Davalan, Gabutero and Generoso to settle the civil aspect of a criminal case for robbery filed by Quiamco against them.

·          They surrendered to him a red Honda motorcycle and a photocopy of its certificate of registration. Respondent asked for the original certificate of registration but the three accused never came to see him again. 

·          Meanwhile, the motorcycle was parked in an open space inside respondent‘s business establishment, where it was visible and accessible to the public.

·          It turned out that, in October 1981, the motorcycle had been sold on installment basis to Gabutero by Uypitching Sons, Inc. And to secure its payment, the motorcycle was mortgaged to petitioner corporation.

·          When Gabutero could no longer pay the installments, Davalan assumed the obligation and continued the payments.

·          In September 1982, however, Davalan stopped paying the remaining installments.

·          Nine years later, petitioner Uypitching, accompanied by policemen, went to Avesco-AVNE Enterprises to recover the motorcycle.

·          The leader of the police team talked to the clerk in charge and asked for respondent. While P/Lt. Vendiola and the clerk were talking, petitioner Uypitching paced back and forth inside the establishment uttering "Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle."

·          Unable to find respondent, the policemen on petitioner Uypitching‘s  instructionand over the clerk‘s objection, took the motorcycle.

·          Petitioner Uypitching filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law against respondent but was dismissed.

·          Respondent filed an action for damages against petitioners in the RTC

·          The trial court rendered a decision finding that petitioner Uypitching was motivated with malice and ill will when he called respondent a thief, took the motorcycle in an abusive manner and filed a baseless complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law

·          Petitioners appealed the RTC decision but the CA affirmed the trial court‘s decision.

ISSUE:

WON the filing of a complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law warranted the award of moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney‘s  fees and costs in favor of respondent.

HELD: YES. 

They were held liable for damages not only for instituting a groundless complaint against respondent but also for making a slanderous remark and for taking the motorcycle from respondent’s establishment in an abusive manner .Petitioners Abused Their Right of Recovery as Mortgagee(s)

  A mortgagee may take steps to recover the mortgaged property to enable it to enforce or protect its foreclosure right there on. There is, however, a well-defined procedure for the recovery of possession of mortgaged property: if a mortgagee is unable to obtain possession of a mortgaged property for its sale on foreclosure, he must bring a civil action either to recover such possession as a preliminary step to the sale, or to obtain judicial foreclosure  .Petitioner corporation failed to bring the proper civil action necessary to acquire legal possession of the motorcycle. Instead, petitioner Uypitching descended on respondent‘s establishment with his policemen and ordered the seizure of the motorcycle without a search warrant or court order. Worse, in the course of the illegal seizure of the motorcycle, petitioner Uypitching even mouthed a slanderous statement.

Petitioners‘ acts violated the law as well as public morals, and transgressed the proper  norms of human relations.

The basic principle of human relations, embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code .Article 19, also known as the "principle of abuse of right," prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith ,otherwise he opens himself to liability. There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure another.

The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh;

there must be nointention to harm another.

In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at petitioners‘ instance was not only attended by bad faith but also contrary to the procedure laid down by law. Considered in conjunction with the defamatory statement, petitioners’ exercise of the right to recover the mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial and injurious to respondent.

Petitioners acted in an excessively harsh fashion to the prejudice of respondent.

Aznar vs. Garcia [7 SCRA 95]

Facts: Edward Christensen’s (citizen of the State of California) will was executed in Manila where it provides that Helen Christensen Garcia receive a payment of P3,600 and proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his daughter Maria Lucy Christensen. Helen Christensen Garcia opposed the project of partition of Edward’s estate claiming that she was deprived of her legitime as acknowledged natural child under the Philippine law. 

Issue: Whether or not the California law or the Philippine law should apply in the case at bar. 

Held: Philippine law should be applied. The State of California prescribes two sets of laws for its citizens residing therein and a conflict of law rules for its citizens domiciled in other jurisdictions. Art. 946 of the California Civil Code states that “If there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner and is governed by the law of his domicile.” Edward, a citizen of the State of California, is considered to have his domicile in the Philippines. The court of domicile cannot and should not refer the case back to the California, as such action would leave the issue incapable of determination, because the case would then be tossed back and forth between the states(doctrine of renvoi). The validity of the provisions of Edward’s will depriving his acknowledged natural child of latter’s legacy, should be governed by the Philippine law. 

The decision appealed from is reversed and the case returned to the lower court with instruction that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides.

Bellis vs. Bellis [20 SCRA 358]

Facts: Amos G. Bellis, a citizen of the State of Texas, died a resident of Texas. The will he had executed in the Philippines directed that his distributable Philippine estate should be divided in trusts. In the project of partition, the executor of the will –pursuant to the “Twelfth” clause of the testator’s Last Will and Testament- divided the residuary estate into 7 equal portions for the benefit of the testator’s seven legitimate children. Maria Christina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children, and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased. 

Issue: Whether or not the Texas law or the Philippine Law should be applied in the case at bar. 

Held: The Court held that since decedent is a citizen of the State of Texas and is domiciled therein at the time of his death, Texas law should apply. Article 16 (2) and Art 1039 render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to 4 items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights ; (c)intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. Under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. 

BARRETO GONZALES vs GONZALES

FACTS:

·          The plaintiff & defendant were both citizens of the Philippines, married & lived together from January 1919 until Spring of 1926. After which they voluntary separated & have not lived together as man & wife, they had 4 minor children together.

·          After negotiations, both parties mutually agreed to allow Manuela Barreto (plaintiff) for her & her children’s support of P500 (five hundred pesos) monthly which to be increased in cases of necessity & illness, and that the title of certain properties be put in her name.

·          Shortly after the agreement, Augusto Gonzales (defendant), when to Reno, Nevada & secured in that jurisdiction an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion dated November 28, 1927. On that same date he went through the forms of marriage with another Filipino citizen as well & had 3children with her.

·          When Gonzales left the Philippines, he reduced the amount he had agreed to pay monthly for the support of Manuela Barreto & her children & has not made the payments fixed in the Reno divorce as alimony.

·          Gonzales came back to the Philippines in August 1928 and shortly after, Barreto brought anaction at the CFI-Manila requesting to confirm & ratify the decree of divorce issued by the courts of Nevada & invoked sec 9 of Act 2710. Such is requested to be enforced, and deliver to theGuardian ad litem the equivalent of what would have been due to their children as their legalportion from respective estates had their parents died intestate on November 28, 1927, they also prayed that the marriage existing between Barreto & Gonzales be declared dissolved & Gonzalesbe ordered to pay Barreto P500 per month, counsel fees of P5000 & all the expenses incurred in educating the 3 minor sons. The guardians of the children also filed as intervenors in the case.

·          After the hearing, the CFI-Manila granted the judgement in favor of the plaintiff & intervenors, but reduced the attorney’s fees to P3000 instead & also granted the costs of the action against the defendant, Hence, this appeal by Gonzales saying that the lower court erred in their decision.

ISSUE:

WON any foreign divorce, relating to citizens of the Philippine Islands, will be recognized in this jurisdiction, except it be for a cause, and under conditions for which the courts of the Philippine Islands would grant a divorce.

NO.

·          The lower court erred in granting the relief as prayed for on granting the divorce, because:

·          The court said that securing the jurisdiction of the courts to recognize & approve the divorce done in Reno, Nevada cannot be done according to the public policy in this jurisdiction on the question of divorce.

·          It’s clear in Act No. 2710 & court decisions on cases such as Goitia VS. Campos Rueda that the entire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation until the case was submitted praying the ratification of the Reno Divorce was clearly a circumvention of the law regarding divorce & will be done under conditions not authorized by our laws.

·          The matrimonial domicile of the couple had always been the Philippines & the residence acquired by the husband in Reno, Nevada was a bona fide residence & did not confer jurisdiction upon the court of that state to dissolve the matrimonial bonds in which he had entered in 1919.

·          Art 9 & Art 11 of the Civil Code & The Divorce Law of the Philippines does not allow such to be done,

·          the effect of foreign divorce in the Philippines says that litigants cannot compel the courts to approve of their own actions or permit the personal relations of the Citizens of the Philippines to be affected by decrees of divorce of foreign courts in manner which out government believes is contrary to public order & good morals

Tenchavez vs. Escano (15 SCRA 355)

FACTS:

27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares.  The marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the couple and was duly registered in the local civil registry.  A certain Pacita Noel came to be their match-maker and go-between who had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college student where she and Vicenta are studying.  Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicenta’s parents.  However after translating the said letter to Vicenta’s dad , he disagreed for a new marriage.  Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila.

Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved she left for the United States and filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada.  She then sought for the annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu.  Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada and has begotten children.  She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958.  Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.

ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon courts of the Philippines.

HELD:

Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce.  Philippine courts cannot give recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of the Civil Code.  Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce in foreign countries.  The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband is enough grounds for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez.  In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still married.  A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines.  Thus, the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages. 

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;

(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;

(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.

Van Dorn vs. Romillo 139 SCRA 139

FACTS:

Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard Upton, a US citizen, was married in Hong Kong in 1979.  They established their residence in the Philippines and had 2 children.  They were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time with Theodore Van Dorn.  A suit against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that petitioner’s business in Ermita Manila, the Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of the business and he be declared as the administrator of the said property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.

HELD:

Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner.  He would have no standing to sue petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets.  He is estopped by his own representation before the court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.  Furthermore, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.  Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to respondent by virtue of her nationality laws.  She should not be discriminated against her own country if the end of justice is to be served.

Constantino vs. Mendez 209 SCRA 18

FACTS:

Michael Constantino, an illegitimate child, as represented by Amelita, her mother, sought monthly support from Ivan Mendez including Amelia’s complaint on damages.  The latter and Amelita met in a restaurant in Manila where she was working as a waitress.  Ivan invited him at his hotel and through promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Amelita, afterwards, he admitted being a married man.  In spite of that, they repeated their sexual contact.  Subsequently, she became pregnant and had to resign from work.

Trial court ruled in favor of Amelita providing actual and moral damages, acknowledging Michael as Ivan’s illegitimate child and giving monthly support to the latter which was set aside by CA.     

ISSUE: WON the alleged illegitimate child is entitled for the monthly support.

HELD:

Amelita Constantino has not proved by clear and convincing evidence her claim that Ivan Mendez is the father of her son Michael Constantino.  Sexual contact of Ivan and Amelita in the first or second week of November, 1974 is the crucial point that was not even established on direct examination as she merely testified that she had sexual intercourse with Ivan in the months of September, October and November, 1974.  More so, Amelita admitted that she was attracted to Ivan and their repeated sexual intercourse indicated that passion and not alleged promise to marriage was the moving force to submit herself with Ivan.

The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

Gashem Shookat Baksh vs Court of Appeals (219 scra 115)

Article 21 of the Civil Code

This is an appeal by certiorari. On October 27, 1987, without the assistance of counsel, private respondent filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint for damages against petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that she is 20 years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her country; other petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student, before August 20, 1987 the latter courted and proposed to marry her, she accepted his love on the condition that they get married; they therefore agreed to get married. The petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano apartments. She was a virgin at that time; after a week before the filing of complaint, petitioner’s attitude towards her started to change. He maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of the complaint. Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and that the petitioner is already married to someone in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering petitioner to pay her damages. On the other hand, petitioner claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent and denied all allegations against him. After trial on the merits, the lower court ordered petitioner to pay the private respondent damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar.

HELD: The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. Notwithstanding, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concepts of torts and quasi-delicts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines quasi-delicts thus:

“Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.”

In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, the court held that where a man’s promise to marry in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and obtain her consent to sexual act could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such breach of promise of marriage but because of the fraud and deceit behind it, and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy.

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners, vs. ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. “AMAY BISAYA”, respondent (G.R. No. 154259 February 28, 2005)

Facts:

                        This is a petition for review on certiorari regarding the reversing decision of the Court of Appeals in the decision of the Trial Court and thus, making the petitioners liable for damages through the abusive conduct of petitioner Lim, imposing upon them P200,000 as exemplary damages, P200,000 as moral damages, and P10,000 as attorney’s fees.

                        Plaintiff Roberto Reyes (Amay Bisaya) was having coffee at the Nikko Hotel lobby on October 13, 1994 at around six in the morning when Dr. Violeta Filart, a long-time friend, approached him and invited him to a party at the penthouse where the hotel’s former manager’s birthday was being celebrated. He consented and carried the latter’s present. At the party, when he was helping himself at the buffet table, Ruby Lim, one of the petitioners, approached him and asked him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by those around the buffet table. Then, a Makati policeman accompanied the embarrassed Amay Bisaya in leaving the penthouse.

                        Ruby Lim accepted the fact that she asked Mr. Reyes to leave but not in the manner he claimed. She said she politely asked Mr. Reyes to finish his food and leave the party as the celebrant wants the party to be intimate, and that he was not invited. On the other hand, Dr. Filart denied Amay Bisaya’s claim that she invited him to the party.

Issue:

                        Whether or not petitioner Lim’s conduct was abusive enough to make the petitioners liable for damages caused to plaintiff.

Held:

                       No. The Supreme Court ruled that any damage which Mr. Reyes might have suffered through Ms. Lim’s exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his to bear alone.

                        The plaintiff failed in proving the ill-motive of the petitioners. It was from his confession that when Ms. Lim approached him, they were very close that they nearly kissed each other. Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when she requested the latter to leave the party, it is apparent that the request was meant to be heard by him only and there could have been no intention on her part to cause him embarrassment. It was plaintiff’s reaction to the request that must have made the other guests aware of what transpired between them. Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the police to take him out. Therefore, we find the petitioners not guilty of violating Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.

                        WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 and its Resolution dated 09 July 2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, dated 26 April 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

                        SO ORDERED.

ALBENSON vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

Albenson Ent. delivered mild steel plates to Guaranteed Industries Inc. A Pacific Banking Corporation Check was paid and drawn against the account of EL Woodworks. Check was later dishonored for the reason “Account Closed.” Company traced source of check and later discovered that the signature belonged to one Eugenio Baltao. Albenson made an extrajudical demand upon Baltao but latter denied that he issued the check or that the signature was his. Company filed a complaint against Baltao for violation of BP 22. It was later discovered that private respondent had son: Eugene Baltao III, who manages the business establishment, EL Woodworks. No effort from the father to inform Albenson of such information. Rather the father filed complaint for damages against Albenson.

ISSUE:

Whether there is indeed cause for the damages against Albenson Enterprise.

RULING:

Based on Art 19, 20, 21 of the civil code, petitioners didn’t have the intent to cause damage to the respondent or enrich themselves but just to collect what was due to them. There was no abuse of right on the part of Albenson on accusing Baltao of BP 22. Albenson Corp. honestly believed that it was private respondent who issued check based on ff inquiries:

·         SEC records showed that president to Guaranteed was Eugene Baltao

·         Bank said signature belonged to EB

·         EB did not do his part in clarifying that there were in fact 3 Ebs, Jr., Sr. and the III.

There was no malicious prosecution on the part of Albenson: there must be proof that:

·         the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person and

·         that damages was initiated deliberately by defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless

Elements of abuse of right under Article 19:

1.        there is a legal right or duty

2.        exercised in bad faith

3.        for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another

Elements under Article 21: contra bonus mores:

1.        there is an act which is legal

2.        but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order or public policy

3.        it is done with intent to injure

A person who has not been paid an obligation owed to him will naturally seek ways to compel the debtor to pay him. It was normal for petitioners to find means to make the issuer of the check pay the amount thereof. In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 14948 dated May 13, 1989, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent Baltao.