Estrada vs. Escritor , 492 SCRA 1 ; 22 JUN 2006

FACTS: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with him as well. Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. 

Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act. 

Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.

RULING: No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition.

Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.

The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.

Liwayway Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco, Corp. (G.R. No. 141309, June 19, 2007)

FACTS:

This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code filed by Fortune against Liwayway as CIR.

On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be charged an ad valorem tax of “55% provided that the maximum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos per pack.” Prior to effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying “Champion,” “Hope,” and “More” (all manufactured by Fortune) as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these cigarette brands were already covered.

In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the issuance of the rule violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws.

For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent has no cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts. She also contended that the complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith.

The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to the CA, who dismissed the case on the ground that under Article 32, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad faith.

Hence this appeal.

ISSUES:

• Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in connection with the discharge of the functions of his/her office
• Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied instead of Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code

HELD:

On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person may suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks. An officer who acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its consent. However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.

Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil liability may arise where the subordinate public officer’s act is characterized by willfulness or negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.

Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in thecourse of the performance of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.

On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is Article 32, it being a special law, which prevails over ageneral law (the Administrative Code).

Article 32 was patterned after the “tort” in American law. A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which has been defined as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property or reputation. There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which the motive of the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine whether the act was wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of another’s legal right; that is, liability in tort in not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent.

UYPITCHING V. QUIAMCO 510 SCRA 172 (2007)

Honeste vivere, non alterum laedere et jus suum cuique tribuere.

To live virtuously, not to injure others and to give everyone his due. These supreme norms of justice are the underlying principles of law and order in society.

FACTS:

·          In 1982, respondent Quiamco was approached by Davalan, Gabutero and Generoso to settle the civil aspect of a criminal case for robbery filed by Quiamco against them.

·          They surrendered to him a red Honda motorcycle and a photocopy of its certificate of registration. Respondent asked for the original certificate of registration but the three accused never came to see him again. 

·          Meanwhile, the motorcycle was parked in an open space inside respondent‘s business establishment, where it was visible and accessible to the public.

·          It turned out that, in October 1981, the motorcycle had been sold on installment basis to Gabutero by Uypitching Sons, Inc. And to secure its payment, the motorcycle was mortgaged to petitioner corporation.

·          When Gabutero could no longer pay the installments, Davalan assumed the obligation and continued the payments.

·          In September 1982, however, Davalan stopped paying the remaining installments.

·          Nine years later, petitioner Uypitching, accompanied by policemen, went to Avesco-AVNE Enterprises to recover the motorcycle.

·          The leader of the police team talked to the clerk in charge and asked for respondent. While P/Lt. Vendiola and the clerk were talking, petitioner Uypitching paced back and forth inside the establishment uttering "Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle."

·          Unable to find respondent, the policemen on petitioner Uypitching‘s  instructionand over the clerk‘s objection, took the motorcycle.

·          Petitioner Uypitching filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law against respondent but was dismissed.

·          Respondent filed an action for damages against petitioners in the RTC

·          The trial court rendered a decision finding that petitioner Uypitching was motivated with malice and ill will when he called respondent a thief, took the motorcycle in an abusive manner and filed a baseless complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law

·          Petitioners appealed the RTC decision but the CA affirmed the trial court‘s decision.

ISSUE:

WON the filing of a complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law warranted the award of moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney‘s  fees and costs in favor of respondent.

HELD: YES. 

They were held liable for damages not only for instituting a groundless complaint against respondent but also for making a slanderous remark and for taking the motorcycle from respondent’s establishment in an abusive manner .Petitioners Abused Their Right of Recovery as Mortgagee(s)

  A mortgagee may take steps to recover the mortgaged property to enable it to enforce or protect its foreclosure right there on. There is, however, a well-defined procedure for the recovery of possession of mortgaged property: if a mortgagee is unable to obtain possession of a mortgaged property for its sale on foreclosure, he must bring a civil action either to recover such possession as a preliminary step to the sale, or to obtain judicial foreclosure  .Petitioner corporation failed to bring the proper civil action necessary to acquire legal possession of the motorcycle. Instead, petitioner Uypitching descended on respondent‘s establishment with his policemen and ordered the seizure of the motorcycle without a search warrant or court order. Worse, in the course of the illegal seizure of the motorcycle, petitioner Uypitching even mouthed a slanderous statement.

Petitioners‘ acts violated the law as well as public morals, and transgressed the proper  norms of human relations.

The basic principle of human relations, embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code .Article 19, also known as the "principle of abuse of right," prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith ,otherwise he opens himself to liability. There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure another.

The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh;

there must be nointention to harm another.

In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at petitioners‘ instance was not only attended by bad faith but also contrary to the procedure laid down by law. Considered in conjunction with the defamatory statement, petitioners’ exercise of the right to recover the mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial and injurious to respondent.

Petitioners acted in an excessively harsh fashion to the prejudice of respondent.

Aznar vs. Garcia [7 SCRA 95]

Facts: Edward Christensen’s (citizen of the State of California) will was executed in Manila where it provides that Helen Christensen Garcia receive a payment of P3,600 and proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his daughter Maria Lucy Christensen. Helen Christensen Garcia opposed the project of partition of Edward’s estate claiming that she was deprived of her legitime as acknowledged natural child under the Philippine law. 

Issue: Whether or not the California law or the Philippine law should apply in the case at bar. 

Held: Philippine law should be applied. The State of California prescribes two sets of laws for its citizens residing therein and a conflict of law rules for its citizens domiciled in other jurisdictions. Art. 946 of the California Civil Code states that “If there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner and is governed by the law of his domicile.” Edward, a citizen of the State of California, is considered to have his domicile in the Philippines. The court of domicile cannot and should not refer the case back to the California, as such action would leave the issue incapable of determination, because the case would then be tossed back and forth between the states(doctrine of renvoi). The validity of the provisions of Edward’s will depriving his acknowledged natural child of latter’s legacy, should be governed by the Philippine law. 

The decision appealed from is reversed and the case returned to the lower court with instruction that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides.

Bellis vs. Bellis [20 SCRA 358]

Facts: Amos G. Bellis, a citizen of the State of Texas, died a resident of Texas. The will he had executed in the Philippines directed that his distributable Philippine estate should be divided in trusts. In the project of partition, the executor of the will –pursuant to the “Twelfth” clause of the testator’s Last Will and Testament- divided the residuary estate into 7 equal portions for the benefit of the testator’s seven legitimate children. Maria Christina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children, and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased. 

Issue: Whether or not the Texas law or the Philippine Law should be applied in the case at bar. 

Held: The Court held that since decedent is a citizen of the State of Texas and is domiciled therein at the time of his death, Texas law should apply. Article 16 (2) and Art 1039 render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to 4 items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights ; (c)intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. Under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. 

BARRETO GONZALES vs GONZALES

FACTS:

·          The plaintiff & defendant were both citizens of the Philippines, married & lived together from January 1919 until Spring of 1926. After which they voluntary separated & have not lived together as man & wife, they had 4 minor children together.

·          After negotiations, both parties mutually agreed to allow Manuela Barreto (plaintiff) for her & her children’s support of P500 (five hundred pesos) monthly which to be increased in cases of necessity & illness, and that the title of certain properties be put in her name.

·          Shortly after the agreement, Augusto Gonzales (defendant), when to Reno, Nevada & secured in that jurisdiction an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion dated November 28, 1927. On that same date he went through the forms of marriage with another Filipino citizen as well & had 3children with her.

·          When Gonzales left the Philippines, he reduced the amount he had agreed to pay monthly for the support of Manuela Barreto & her children & has not made the payments fixed in the Reno divorce as alimony.

·          Gonzales came back to the Philippines in August 1928 and shortly after, Barreto brought anaction at the CFI-Manila requesting to confirm & ratify the decree of divorce issued by the courts of Nevada & invoked sec 9 of Act 2710. Such is requested to be enforced, and deliver to theGuardian ad litem the equivalent of what would have been due to their children as their legalportion from respective estates had their parents died intestate on November 28, 1927, they also prayed that the marriage existing between Barreto & Gonzales be declared dissolved & Gonzalesbe ordered to pay Barreto P500 per month, counsel fees of P5000 & all the expenses incurred in educating the 3 minor sons. The guardians of the children also filed as intervenors in the case.

·          After the hearing, the CFI-Manila granted the judgement in favor of the plaintiff & intervenors, but reduced the attorney’s fees to P3000 instead & also granted the costs of the action against the defendant, Hence, this appeal by Gonzales saying that the lower court erred in their decision.

ISSUE:

WON any foreign divorce, relating to citizens of the Philippine Islands, will be recognized in this jurisdiction, except it be for a cause, and under conditions for which the courts of the Philippine Islands would grant a divorce.

NO.

·          The lower court erred in granting the relief as prayed for on granting the divorce, because:

·          The court said that securing the jurisdiction of the courts to recognize & approve the divorce done in Reno, Nevada cannot be done according to the public policy in this jurisdiction on the question of divorce.

·          It’s clear in Act No. 2710 & court decisions on cases such as Goitia VS. Campos Rueda that the entire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation until the case was submitted praying the ratification of the Reno Divorce was clearly a circumvention of the law regarding divorce & will be done under conditions not authorized by our laws.

·          The matrimonial domicile of the couple had always been the Philippines & the residence acquired by the husband in Reno, Nevada was a bona fide residence & did not confer jurisdiction upon the court of that state to dissolve the matrimonial bonds in which he had entered in 1919.

·          Art 9 & Art 11 of the Civil Code & The Divorce Law of the Philippines does not allow such to be done,

·          the effect of foreign divorce in the Philippines says that litigants cannot compel the courts to approve of their own actions or permit the personal relations of the Citizens of the Philippines to be affected by decrees of divorce of foreign courts in manner which out government believes is contrary to public order & good morals

Tenchavez vs. Escano (15 SCRA 355)

FACTS:

27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares.  The marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the couple and was duly registered in the local civil registry.  A certain Pacita Noel came to be their match-maker and go-between who had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college student where she and Vicenta are studying.  Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicenta’s parents.  However after translating the said letter to Vicenta’s dad , he disagreed for a new marriage.  Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila.

Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved she left for the United States and filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada.  She then sought for the annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu.  Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada and has begotten children.  She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958.  Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.

ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon courts of the Philippines.

HELD:

Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce.  Philippine courts cannot give recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of the Civil Code.  Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce in foreign countries.  The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband is enough grounds for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez.  In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still married.  A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines.  Thus, the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages. 

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;

(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;

(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.

Van Dorn vs. Romillo 139 SCRA 139

FACTS:

Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard Upton, a US citizen, was married in Hong Kong in 1979.  They established their residence in the Philippines and had 2 children.  They were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time with Theodore Van Dorn.  A suit against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that petitioner’s business in Ermita Manila, the Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of the business and he be declared as the administrator of the said property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.

HELD:

Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner.  He would have no standing to sue petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets.  He is estopped by his own representation before the court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.  Furthermore, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.  Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to respondent by virtue of her nationality laws.  She should not be discriminated against her own country if the end of justice is to be served.

Constantino vs. Mendez 209 SCRA 18

FACTS:

Michael Constantino, an illegitimate child, as represented by Amelita, her mother, sought monthly support from Ivan Mendez including Amelia’s complaint on damages.  The latter and Amelita met in a restaurant in Manila where she was working as a waitress.  Ivan invited him at his hotel and through promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Amelita, afterwards, he admitted being a married man.  In spite of that, they repeated their sexual contact.  Subsequently, she became pregnant and had to resign from work.

Trial court ruled in favor of Amelita providing actual and moral damages, acknowledging Michael as Ivan’s illegitimate child and giving monthly support to the latter which was set aside by CA.     

ISSUE: WON the alleged illegitimate child is entitled for the monthly support.

HELD:

Amelita Constantino has not proved by clear and convincing evidence her claim that Ivan Mendez is the father of her son Michael Constantino.  Sexual contact of Ivan and Amelita in the first or second week of November, 1974 is the crucial point that was not even established on direct examination as she merely testified that she had sexual intercourse with Ivan in the months of September, October and November, 1974.  More so, Amelita admitted that she was attracted to Ivan and their repeated sexual intercourse indicated that passion and not alleged promise to marriage was the moving force to submit herself with Ivan.

The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

Gashem Shookat Baksh vs Court of Appeals (219 scra 115)

Article 21 of the Civil Code

This is an appeal by certiorari. On October 27, 1987, without the assistance of counsel, private respondent filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint for damages against petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that she is 20 years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her country; other petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student, before August 20, 1987 the latter courted and proposed to marry her, she accepted his love on the condition that they get married; they therefore agreed to get married. The petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano apartments. She was a virgin at that time; after a week before the filing of complaint, petitioner’s attitude towards her started to change. He maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of the complaint. Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and that the petitioner is already married to someone in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering petitioner to pay her damages. On the other hand, petitioner claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent and denied all allegations against him. After trial on the merits, the lower court ordered petitioner to pay the private respondent damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar.

HELD: The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. Notwithstanding, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concepts of torts and quasi-delicts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines quasi-delicts thus:

“Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.”

In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, the court held that where a man’s promise to marry in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and obtain her consent to sexual act could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such breach of promise of marriage but because of the fraud and deceit behind it, and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy.

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners, vs. ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. “AMAY BISAYA”, respondent (G.R. No. 154259 February 28, 2005)

Facts:

                        This is a petition for review on certiorari regarding the reversing decision of the Court of Appeals in the decision of the Trial Court and thus, making the petitioners liable for damages through the abusive conduct of petitioner Lim, imposing upon them P200,000 as exemplary damages, P200,000 as moral damages, and P10,000 as attorney’s fees.

                        Plaintiff Roberto Reyes (Amay Bisaya) was having coffee at the Nikko Hotel lobby on October 13, 1994 at around six in the morning when Dr. Violeta Filart, a long-time friend, approached him and invited him to a party at the penthouse where the hotel’s former manager’s birthday was being celebrated. He consented and carried the latter’s present. At the party, when he was helping himself at the buffet table, Ruby Lim, one of the petitioners, approached him and asked him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by those around the buffet table. Then, a Makati policeman accompanied the embarrassed Amay Bisaya in leaving the penthouse.

                        Ruby Lim accepted the fact that she asked Mr. Reyes to leave but not in the manner he claimed. She said she politely asked Mr. Reyes to finish his food and leave the party as the celebrant wants the party to be intimate, and that he was not invited. On the other hand, Dr. Filart denied Amay Bisaya’s claim that she invited him to the party.

Issue:

                        Whether or not petitioner Lim’s conduct was abusive enough to make the petitioners liable for damages caused to plaintiff.

Held:

                       No. The Supreme Court ruled that any damage which Mr. Reyes might have suffered through Ms. Lim’s exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his to bear alone.

                        The plaintiff failed in proving the ill-motive of the petitioners. It was from his confession that when Ms. Lim approached him, they were very close that they nearly kissed each other. Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when she requested the latter to leave the party, it is apparent that the request was meant to be heard by him only and there could have been no intention on her part to cause him embarrassment. It was plaintiff’s reaction to the request that must have made the other guests aware of what transpired between them. Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the police to take him out. Therefore, we find the petitioners not guilty of violating Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.

                        WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 and its Resolution dated 09 July 2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, dated 26 April 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

                        SO ORDERED.

ALBENSON vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

Albenson Ent. delivered mild steel plates to Guaranteed Industries Inc. A Pacific Banking Corporation Check was paid and drawn against the account of EL Woodworks. Check was later dishonored for the reason “Account Closed.” Company traced source of check and later discovered that the signature belonged to one Eugenio Baltao. Albenson made an extrajudical demand upon Baltao but latter denied that he issued the check or that the signature was his. Company filed a complaint against Baltao for violation of BP 22. It was later discovered that private respondent had son: Eugene Baltao III, who manages the business establishment, EL Woodworks. No effort from the father to inform Albenson of such information. Rather the father filed complaint for damages against Albenson.

ISSUE:

Whether there is indeed cause for the damages against Albenson Enterprise.

RULING:

Based on Art 19, 20, 21 of the civil code, petitioners didn’t have the intent to cause damage to the respondent or enrich themselves but just to collect what was due to them. There was no abuse of right on the part of Albenson on accusing Baltao of BP 22. Albenson Corp. honestly believed that it was private respondent who issued check based on ff inquiries:

·         SEC records showed that president to Guaranteed was Eugene Baltao

·         Bank said signature belonged to EB

·         EB did not do his part in clarifying that there were in fact 3 Ebs, Jr., Sr. and the III.

There was no malicious prosecution on the part of Albenson: there must be proof that:

·         the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person and

·         that damages was initiated deliberately by defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless

Elements of abuse of right under Article 19:

1.        there is a legal right or duty

2.        exercised in bad faith

3.        for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another

Elements under Article 21: contra bonus mores:

1.        there is an act which is legal

2.        but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order or public policy

3.        it is done with intent to injure

A person who has not been paid an obligation owed to him will naturally seek ways to compel the debtor to pay him. It was normal for petitioners to find means to make the issuer of the check pay the amount thereof. In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 14948 dated May 13, 1989, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent Baltao.

National marketing corporation vs Tecson (GR no. L-20131, 27 August 1969)

Facts:

December 21, 1965, National Marketing Corporation filed a complaint, docketed as civil case no. 63701 on the same court, as successor of the Price Stabilization Corporation, against the same defendant from 10 years ago. Defendant Miguel Tecson moved to dismiss the said complaint upon the ground lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of that and prescription of action. The court, then, issued an order of dismissal with regards the article 13 of the civil code. However, National Marketing Corporation appealed to the court of appeals from such order. Looking at the fact that 1960 and 1964 is a leap year, they insisted that a "year" means a "calendar year" and a leap year would still be counted as 1 year even if it consists of 366 days. The case reached its conclusion with the appellant's theory with regards to the article 13 of the civil code.

Issues:

Whether or not the term "year" as used in the article 13 of the civil code is limited to 365 days.

Ruling:

The term "year" as used in the article 13 of the civil code is limited to 365 days. However, it is said to be unrealistic and if public interest demands a reversion to the policy embodied in the revised administrative code, this may be done through legislative process and not by judicial decree.

Garcia vs. Recio G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001

Facts:

Article 26; The respondent, Rederick Recio, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Rizal in 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, the Australian family court issued a decree of divorce supposedly dissolving the marriage. In 1992, respondent acquired Australian citizenship. In 1994, he married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein petitioner, inCabanatuan City. In their application for marriage license, respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino.” Since October 1995, they lived separately, and in 1996 while in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided. In 1998, petitioner filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that she learned of the respondent’s former marriage only in November. On the other hand, respondent claims that he told petitioner of his prior marriage in 1993, before they were married. Respondent also contended that his first marriage was dissolved by a divorce a decree obtained in Australia in 1989 and hence, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. The trial court declared that the first marriage was dissolved on the ground of the divorce issued in Australia as valid and recognized in the Philippines. Hence, this petition was forwarded before the Supreme Court.

 Issue:

Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry Grace Garcia.

Ruling:

In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is “validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.” A divorce obtained abroad by two aliens, may be recognized in thePhilippines, provided it is consistent with their respective laws. Therefore, before our courts can recognize a foreign divorce, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. In this case, the divorce decree between the respondent and

Samson appears to be authentic, issued by an Australian family court. Although, appearance is not sufficient, and compliance with the rules on evidence regarding alleged foreign laws must be demonstrated, the decree was admitted on account of petitioner’s failure to object properly because he objected to the fact that it was not registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City, not to its admissibility. Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted as evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law. Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes, still restrict remarriage. Respondent also failed to produce sufficient evidence showing the foreign law governing his status. Together with other evidences submitted, they don’t absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry.

RURAL BANK OF CALOOCAN, INC. and JOSE O. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MAXIMA CASTRO, respondents.(G.R. No. L-32116 April 2l, 1981 )

FACTS:

Maxima Castro, accompanied by Severino Valencia, went to the Rural Bank of Caloocan to apply for a loan. Valencia arranged everything about the loan with the bank. He supplied to the latter the personal data required for Castro's loan application. After the bank approved the loan for the amount of P3,000.00, Castro, accompanied by the Valencia spouses, signed a promissory note corresponding to her loan in favor of the bank. On the same day, the Valencia spouses obtained from the bank an equal amount of loan for P3,000.00. They signed another promissory note (Exhibit "2") corresponding to their loan in favor of the bank and had Castro affixed thereon her signature as co-maker.

Both loans were secured by a real-estate mortgage on Castro's house and lot. Later, the sheriff of Manila sent a notice to Castro, saying that her property would be sold at public auction to satisfy the obligation covering the two promissory notes plus interest and attorney's fees. Upon request by Castro and the Valencias and with conformity of the bank, the auction sale was postponed, but was nevertheless auctioned at a later date.

Castro claimed that she is a 70-year old widow who cannot read and write in English. According to her, she has only finished second grade. She needed money in the amount of P3,000.00 to invest in the business of the defendant spouses Valencia, who accompanied her to the bank to secure a loan of P3,000.00. While at the bank, an employee handed to her several forms already prepared which she was asked to sign, with no one explaining to her the nature and contents of the documents. She also alleged that it was only when she received the letter from the sheriff that she learned that the mortgage contract which was an encumbrance on her property was for P6.000.00 and not for P3,000.00 and that she was made to sign as co-maker of the promissory note without her being informed.

Castro filed a suit against petitioners contending that thru mistake on her part or fraud on the part of Valencias she was induced to sign as co-maker of a promissory note and to constitute a mortgage on her house and lot to secure the questioned note. At the time of filing her complaint, respondent Castro deposited the amount of P3,383.00 with the court a quo in full payment of her personal loan plus interest.

Castro prayed for:

(1)the annulment as far as she is concerned of the promissory note (Exhibit "2") and mortgage (Exhibit "6") insofar as it exceeds P3,000.00; and (2)for the discharge of her personal obligation with the bank by reason of a deposit of P3,383.00 with the court a quo upon the filing of her complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent court correctly affirmed the lower court in declaring the promissory note (Exhibit 2) invalid insofar as they affect respondent Castro vis-a-vis petitioner bank, and the mortgage contract (Exhibit 6) valid up to the amount of P3,000.00 only.

HELD: Yes.

RATIO:

While the Valencias defrauded Castro by making her sign the promissory note and the mortgage contract, they also misrepresented to the bank Castro's personal qualifications in order to secure its consent to the loan. Thus, as a result of the fraud upon Castro and the misrepresentation to the bank inflicted by the Valencias both Castro and the bank committed mistake in giving their consents to the contracts. In other words, substantial mistake vitiated their consents given. For if Castro had been aware of what she signed and the bank of the true qualifications of the loan applicants, it is evident that they would not have given their consents to the contracts.

Article 1342 of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 1342. Misrepresentation by a third person does not vitiate consent, unless such misrepresentation has created substantial mistake and the same is mutual.

We cannot declare the promissory note valid between the bank and Castro and the mortgage contract binding on Castro beyond the amount of P3,000.00, for while the contracts may not be invalidated insofar as they affect the bank and Castro on the ground of fraud because the bank was not a participant thereto, such may however be invalidated on the ground of substantial mistake mutually committed by them as a consequence of the fraud and misrepresentation inflicted by the Valencias.

Thus, in the case of Hill vs. Veloso, this Court declared that a contract may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent if deceit by a third person, even without connivance or complicity with one of the contracting parties, resulted in mutual error on the part of the parties to the contract.

The fraud particularly averred in the complaint, having been proven, is deemed sufficient basis for the declaration of the promissory note invalid insofar as it affects Castro vis-a-vis the bank, and the mortgage contract valid only up to the amount of P3,000.00.

Firestone Tire and Rubber Company of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Carlos Lariosa and National Labor Relations Commission, respondents ( February 27, 1987)

Facts:

Carlos Lariosa, worked in Firestone Tire and Rubber Company for 11 years as a tire builder. On July 27, 1983, on his way out the company premises, he was frisked by security Lizo and Olvez. They found 16 wool flannel swabs inside his bag tucked underneath his soiled clothes, all belonging to the company. He was then dismissed effective on August 2, 1983 through letter of Ms. Villavicani, company president, based on “stealing company property and loss of trust”. Lariosa on the other hand filed with the Labor and Employment a case for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter found Laniosa’s dismissal justified but was reversed by the NLRC onappeal and held that Lianosa be reinstated but without backwages.

Issue:

Whether the act of Firestone Tire and Rubber Company was within the realm on laws on Protection to Labor Law

Held:

From the records, it is likewise clear that Firestone did not act arbitrarily in terminating Linasosa’s services. Based on records, an investigation of the incident was conducted in the presence of Lianosa, the Union President, and the Security Guards who witnessed the attempted asportation. Thus, we cannot agree with the NLRC’s conclusion that even if Firestone has substantial proof, it did not observe statutory requirements of due process. Under Article 283 of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate an employee for serious misconduct. ‘If there is sufficient evidence that an employee has been guilty of a breach of trust/ that his employer has ample reason to distrust him, the Labor tribunal cannot justly deny to the employer the authority to dismiss such employee. ’Wherefore, petition granted. NLRC decision is hereby set aside.

CASE DIGEST OF YAO KEE V. SY-GONZALES [167 SCRA 737]

FACTS: Sy-Kiat, a Chinese national, died in 1977 in Kaloocan City, where he was residing, leaving behind substantial real and personal properties here in the Phils. Petition for letters of administration filed by his natural children, was opposed on the ground that Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee, in Fookien, China on 1/13/31 and that the oppositors are the legitimate children. The probate court rendered judgment in favor of the oppositors; this was modified and set aside by the CA w/c held that both sets of children were acknowledged natural children. Both parties moved for partial reconsideration. 

HELD: For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance w/ said law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction. In the case at bar, petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and customs of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of China's law or custom on marriage not only bec. they are self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are competent to testify on the subject matter.

Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory." The law requires that "a custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence." On this score the Court had occasion to state that "a local custom as a source of right can not be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any other fact." The same evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be required of a foreign custom. 

Martinez v Van Buskirk Digest

Facts:

1.   On the 11th day of September, 1908, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding a carromata in Ermita, Manila when a delivery wagon owned by the defendant (used for the transportation of fodder and to which two horses are attached), came from the opposite direction, while their carromata  went close to the sidewalk in order to let the delivery wagon pass by.    However, instead of merely passing by, the horses ran into the carromata occupied by the plaintiff with her child and overturned it, causing a serious cut upon the plaintiff’s head.

3.   The defendant contends that the cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at the time of the accident, was actually a good servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero. He also claims that the cochero was tasked to deliver some forage at Calle Herran, and for that purpose the defendant’s employee tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon for the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered. However, a vehicle passed by the driver and made noises that frightened the horses causing them to run. The employee failed to stop the horses since he was thrown upon the ground.

4.   From the stated facts, the court ruled that the defendant was guilty of negligence. The court specifically cited a paragraph of Article 1903 of the Civil Code. Hence, this is appeal to reverse such decision.

Issue: Whether or not the employer, who has furnished a gentle and tractable team (of horses) and a trusty and capable driver, is liable for the negligence of such driver.

NO. The cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the manner described by the evidence in this case. It is believed that acts or performances which, in a long time, have not been destructive and which are approved by the society are considered as custom. Hence, they cannot be considered as unreasonable or imprudent.

 The reason why they have been permitted by the society is that they are beneficial rather that prejudicial. One could not easily hold someone negligent because of some act that led to an injury or accident. It would be unfair therefore to render the cochero negligent because of such circumstances.

 The court further held that it is a universal practice of merchants during that time to deliver products through horse-drawn vehicles; and it is also considered universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they were left during the accident. It has been practiced for a long time and generally has not been the cause of accidents or injuries the judgment is therefore reversed.

, People vs. Purisima, (GR No. L -47757-61, January 28, 1980)

FACTS: Informations were filed to 26 individuals from Manila and Samar, individually and separately, before the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Samar for illegal possession of deadly weapon orviolation of Presidential Decree No. 9 pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated Sept 21 and 23, 1973. On the motion to quash by the accused, the three respondent judges: Judge Purisima and Judge Macaren, both of CFI of Manila; and Judge Polo of CFI of Samar, issued in the respective cases filed before them an order to quash or dismiss the informations on a common ground – Lack of essential elements to constitute an offense penalized by PD No. 9. The respondent judges stated that to constitute the said offense, two elements must be present; (1) possession of any bladed, blunt or pointed weapon outside of residence as stated in par 3; (2) and intended to use it to commit or abet subversion, rebellion, etc as stated in the preamble of the said PD. The People, as petitioners, thru the Solicitor General, contended that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities and the intent of the accused are irrelevant since its is a statutory offense and punishing the possession of such deadly weapon is not only to eradicate subversive acts but also criminality in general. The petitioners also argued that the preamble is not an essential part of an act and cannot prevail over the text of the law itself.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners’ arguments as to the intention and scope of PD No. 9 (3) correct?

HELD: NO. The Supreme Court says that the intention of PD No. 9 (3) is to penalize the acts which are those related to the desired result of Proc. No. 1081 and Gen. Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are to suppress those who commit or abet lawlessness, rebellion, subversive acts and the like. The preamble of PD No. 9 also clearly concurs to that, though the preamble is not a part of the statute, it is the key to determine what is the intent and spirit of the decree and determine what acts fall within the purview of a penal statute.

Corpus vs. Cabaluna(January 31. 1974)

FACTS:

Lourdes Corpus was declared the owner of two parcels of land located in Barrio Bugang Municipality of Alimodian on September 5, 1955 by the Court of First Instance of Iloilo and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on February 26, 1963.

On July 30, 1963, Adriano Camarista executed deed of sale to the Cabalfin couple and the document was ratified by Municipal Judge of Alimodian, Mr. Cipriano P. Cabaluna, Jr., for the cadastral land 1762, which apparently was the same land litigated in the civil case of Corpus.

Corpus charged Judge Cabaluna with having committed “gross fraud” for ratifying a deed of sale of cadastral land 1762 despite the Judge’s supposed knowledge of the pendency of the civil case before the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ratification of the deed of sale by the respondent makes him guilty of “gross fraud”.

RULING:

For the charge of “gross fraud” to prosper there is need of clear and convincing evidence that respondent knew that one of the parcels involved in civil case 2843 and adjudicated to complainant was the same property which he awarded o the Cabalfin couples in the cadastral proceeding: such evidence is, however, wanting in the record of this case.

Fraud is serious charge which cannot be lightly inferred from allegations or circumstances surrounding a particular situation, but must be supported by clear and convincing proof. 

Complainant’s failure to bring out that the respondent was cognizant of the relation of the property involved in the civil case to the land applied for in the cadastral proceeding, shows that the respondent could not have connived with the claimant Camarista and/or the Cabalfins in causing the approval of the latter’s claim over the land in question to the prejudice of the rights of the complainant.

The respondent was exonerated and the charge was dismissed.