MARCOS V. MARCOS

Facts

Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had five children. Alleging that the husband failed to provide material support to the family and have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the marriage for psychological incapacity. The RTC declared the marriage null and void under Art. 36 which was however reversed by CA. 

Issues

Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the respondent by a physician is a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. 

Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity. 

Held

Psychological incapacity as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however that the respondent be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such declaration. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his “defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home. Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver. In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of the petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurabilty and for her failure to observe the guidelines as outline in Republic v. CA and Molina.

REPUBLIC VS. DAGDAG 351 SCRA 425

FACTS:

On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20 years old, at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. The marriage certificate was issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of on October 20, 1988. Erlinda and Avelino begot two children. The birth certificates were issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija also on October 20, 1988. A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear for months, suddenly re-appear for a few months, and then disappear again. During the times when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends and would return home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical injuries to her.

In October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last that they heard from him. Erlinda learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime, and that he escaped from jail and remains at large to-date. In July 1990, Erlinda filed with the RTC of Olongapo City a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since Avelino could not be located, summons was served by publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of general circulation. On the date set for presentation of evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her sister-in-law as her only witness.

The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating prosecutor until January 2, 1991 to manifest in writing whether or not he would present controverting evidence, and stating that should he fail to file said manifestation, the case would be deemed submitted for decision. The Investigating Prosecutor conducted an investigation and found that there was no collusion between the parties. 

However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of evidence. Without waiting for the investigating prosecutor’s manifestation, the trial court declared the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void under Article 36. The investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the ground that the decision was prematurely rendered since he was given until January 2, 1991 to manifest whether he was presenting controverting evidence. The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the same is not in accordance with the evidence and the law. Since the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court holding that “Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to perform the duties and obligations of a married person but because he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal.”

ISSUE:

Did the CA correctly declare the marriage as null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, on the ground that the husband suffers from psychological incapacity, as he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from justice?

HELD:

Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on “all fours” with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.

In REPUBLIC VS. MOLINA (268 SCRA 198), the Court laid down the GUIDELINES in the interpretation of Article 36 of the Family Code.

Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the above-mentioned evidentiary requirements. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline number 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Further, the allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which he was arrested was not even alleged. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence since the trial court’s decision was prematurely rendered.

Republic vs. Nolasco 220 SCRA 20

 FACTS:

Gregorio Nolasco is a seaman.  He met Janet Parker, a British, in bar in England.  After that, Janet started living with Nolasco in his ship for six months.  It lasted until the contract of Nolasco expired then he brought her to his hometown in Antique.  They got married in January 1982.  Due to another contract, Nolasco left the province.  In 1983, Nolasco received a letter from his mother informing him that his son had been born but 15 days after, Janet left.  Nolasco went home and cut short his contract to find Janet’s whereabouts.  He did so by securing another seaman’s contract going to London.  He wrote several letters to the bar where they first met but it was all returned.  Gregorio petitioned in 1988 for a declaration of presumptive death of Janet. 

ISSUE: Whether or not Nolasco had a well-founded belief that his wife, Janet, is already dead?

HELD: 

The Supreme Court ruled that Nolasco’s efforts to locate Janet were not persistent to show that he has a well-founded belief that his wife was already dead because instead of seeking assistance of local authorities and the British Embassy, he even secured another contract.  More so, while he was in London, he did not even try to solicit help of the authorities to find his wife.

Republic vs. Court of Appeals

The facts:

On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro’s parents. The marriage contract states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila. The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant that the couple decided to live together. Their cohabitation only lasted for four months and then the couple parted ways. The baby was adopted by Castro’s brother, with the consent of Cardenas. It was then discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage as confirmed by a certification from the Civil Register of Pasig, Metro Manila. Her husband was duly served with notice of the proceedings and a copy of the petition but he chose to ignore it, thus, he was properly declared in default. The trial court denied her petition on the ground that the certification was inadequate to establish the alleged non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage of the contracting parties. The appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines now assailed the decision of the appellate court and posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of due search and inability to find a record or entry to the effect that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued to the parties is not adequate to prove its non-issuance. 

The Issue:

Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the marriage or private respondent to Edwin Cardenas?

Held:

The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a “secret marriage”, ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of the contracting parties. At the time the marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was the New Civil Code which provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio. 

The certification of due search and inability to find issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to section 29, rule 132 of the rules of court, a certificate of due search and inability to find sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties. There was absolutely no evidence on record to show that there was collusion between private respondent and her husband Cardenas. It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that the marriage between the contracting parties is null and void for lack of marriage license does not discount that fact that indeed, a spurious marriage license, purporting to be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, may have been presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer.

This court holds that under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license. The petition is Denied there being no showing of any reversible error committed by respondent appellate court.

Martinez vs. Martinez G.R. No. 162084 June 28, 2005

Facts: The spouses Martinez were the owners of a parcel of land as well as the house constructed thereon. Daniel, Sr. executed a Last Will and Testament directing the subdivision of the property into three lots. He then bequeathed the three lots to each of his sons, namely, Rodolfo, Manolo and Daniel, Jr. Manolo was designated as the administrator of the estate. 

Rodolfo found a deed of sale purportedly signed by his father, where the latter appears to have sold to Manolo and his wife Lucila. Rodolfo filed a complaint for annulment of deed of sale and cancellation of TCT against his brother Manolo and his sister-in-law Lucila before the RTC. RTC dismissed the complaint for annulment of deed of sale on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the action since there was no allegation in the complaint that the last will of Daniel Martinez, Sr. had been admitted to probate. Rodolfo appealed the order to the CA. 

In the meantime, the spouses Manolo and Lucila Martinez wrote Rodolfo, demanding that he vacate the property. Rodolfo ignored the letter and refused to do so. This prompted the said spouses to file a complaint for unlawful detainer against Rodolfo in the MTC of Manila. They alleged that they were the owners of the property. The spouses Martinez alleged in their position paper that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made and/or exerted by them, but that the same proved futile. No amicable settlement was, likewise, reached by the parties during the preliminary conference because of irreconcilable differences. 

Issue: Whether or not the certification to file action and the allegations in the complaint that the case passed through the barangay are sufficient compliance to prove that earnest efforts were made. 

Ruling: The petition was granted. As pointed out by the Code Commission, it is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a compromise before litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family and it is known that a lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers. 

Thus, a party’s failure to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code before filing a complaint against a family member would render such complaint premature.

Director of Lands v. Abelardo

Facts: The case revolves around proving the ownership of 2 parcels of lands, which were properties subject in a successional litigation.  Siblings Fulgencia and Jose Dino are contesting the ownership of subject properties in Manuel Libunao’s possession.  They further claim that as deaf-mutes, they should not be barred by prescription in filing the case.

Issue: Whether or not the prescription period in filing the case should be relaxed due to their being deaf-mutes.

Held: No, they are not.  The SC ruled that the subject lands are still and should still be owned by Manuel Libuano and family due to the following reasons (1) the preponderance of evidence as to the ownership of the lands are in favor of Libunao, (2) the action for filing a claim regarding the partition of the estate has already prescribed.

Being a deaf-mute is not by itself alone, without the concurrence of any of the incapacities recognized by law, considered included among the exceptions which in matters of prescription, are granted to incapacitated persons, in connection with the running of the prescriptive period.

People v. Sasota

Facts: Defendant was charged with the crime of rape of a deaf and dumb girl.  Sasota, found guilty of the crime because of the victim’s testimony, now posits that the testimony of the deaf and dumb should not have been accepted by the court at its full value.

Issue: Whether or not a deaf and dumb person is considered a competent witness by the court.

Held: There is no merit in the contention of the defendant that deaf and dumb persons are to be considered incompetent witnesses.  Though formerly, deaf and dump persons were considered incompetent, experience and observation have shown conclusively that the mere fact that a person is deaf and dumb is not sufficient to justify the finding that he is incompetent as a witness.  When such a witness is produced, the court may ascertain whether he has the requisite intelligence, and the judge will allow the witness to adopt such mode of communicating his ideas, whether by signs or writing as he deems most satisfactory.

US v. Vaquilar (Killing his Wife and Daughter)

Facts: 

Evaristo Vaquilar was found guilty of killing his wife and his daughter, as well as injuring other persons with a bolo.  Eyewitnesses testified that the defendant appeared to be insane prior to the commission of the crimes.  They also testified that the appellant was complaining of pains in his head and stomach prior to the killing. The witnesses’ evidence for insanity include:

•        “appellants eyes were very big and red with his sight penetrating at the time he was killing his wife.”

•        “he looked at me he was crazy because if he was not, he wouldn’t have killed his family”

•        at the moment of cutting those people, “he looked like a madman; crazy because he would cut anybody at random”

•        sister said, “…then he pursued me….he must have been crazy because he cut me”

Issue: 

Whether or not these pieces of evidence are sufficient to declare the accused as insane, therefore exempt from criminal liability.

Held: 

The evidence is insufficient to declare him insane.  The appellant’s conduct was consistent with the acts of an enraged criminal, not of a person with an unsound mind at the time he committed the crimes. The fact that a person acts crazy is not conclusive that he is insane.   The popular meaning of “crazy” is not synonymous with the legal terms “insane”.  The conduct of the appellant after he was confined in jail is not inconsistent with the actions of a sane person (not saying a word in the cell, crying out loud at night) who has reflected and felt remorse after the commission of the crime.

The court further held that mere mental depravity, or moral insanity which results not from any disease of the mind, but from  a perverted condition of the moral system where the person is mentally sane, does not exempt one from criminal responsibility.  In the absence of proof that the defendant had lost his reason or became demented after a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it is presumed that he was in a normal state of mind

Carillo vs. jaojaco (956 Phil. 46) March 24, 1925

Miguela Carrillo, as sister of deceased Adriana Carrillo and current administratrix of the latter’s estate, brought action to the CFI Cavite for the annulment of the document of because her sister was declared mentally incapacitated nine days after the transaction. The defendants were absolved from the complaint and from this judgment the plaintiff appealed.

Facts:

Nov. 13, 1918 – Adriana is confined in Hospital de San Juan de Dios for cerebral hemorrhage with hemiplegia. Marcos Jaojoco and his father Justiniano, defendant-appellees, nephew and brother-in-law, respectively to the deceased, were theones who took her to the hospital and cared for her. Dec. 18, 1918 – Adriana left the hospital and called a notary public to execute the sale of land (11 parcels of land in the barrio of Ulong-Tubig, municipality of Carmona, province of Cavite at the price of P4000) to Marcos Jaojoco. Nine days later, she dies and Miguela is appointed judicial administratrix of said estate. (It is interesting to note that Miguela was the surety of her sister when the latter acquired it from her husband in January 1917.)

Issue:

WON Adrian Carrillo was mentally incapacitated in executing the document of sale.

Held/Ratio:

No. The plaintiff’s attempt to prove that Adriana was mentally deranged was insufficient. Being confined in a hospital does not prove insanity. Her doctor testified that her sickness did not affect her head but only ½ of her body. Documents produced before the Court before the execution of the document of sale, shows complex tasks done by Adriana which couldn’t be done by a mentally incapacitated person

GELUZ v COURT OF APPEALS – ART 37, 40-47

FACTS:

 Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948 — through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion. It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz we granted certiorari.

 ISSUE:

Did the Plaintiff have the right for damages in behalf of his unborn child?

HELD:

No. The fetus was not yet born and thus does not have civil personality. According to Article 40, birth determines personality. In this case, the fetus does not yet possess a personality to speak of because it was aborted in uterus. The child should be born before the parents can seek any recovery for damages. Action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured. There could be no action for such damages that can be instituted on behalf of the unborn child for the injuries it received because it lacked juridical personality. The damages which the parents of an unborn child can recover are limited to moral damages, in this case, for the act of the appellant Geluz to perform the abortion. However, moral damages cannot also be recovered because the wife willingly sought the abortion, and the husband did not further investigate on the causes of the abortion. Furthermore, the husband did not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant, but was more concerned in obtaining from the doctor a large money payment.