Secretary Justice vs. Catolico (68 SCRA 62 )

FACTS:

Two administrative complaints and four charges of “serious misconduct and gross disregard of law” were formulated against Judge Alfredo Catolico. The first complaint concerned that of the naturalization of 50 naturalized citizens which the the respondent declared the oath taking of the petitioners null and void. The second and third complaints which relate to respondent’s dismissal of the cases which have not been tried for more than thirty days and refusal to recognize not only the authority of the Court to authorize the continuation of the corresponding proceedings but also the personality of the Clerk of this Court to transmit to him the pertinent resolutions of the Court. The fourth complaint regarding the respondents alleged bias and prejudice either in his questioning of the witnesses or in acquitting the accused. Respondent claims that all his impugned actuations were motivated by his desire to comply with the rules and the law and, most of all, the best interests of justice which require the speedy and expeditious disposition of cases. Respondents plead that “if at all there was any error committed it is of the mind rather than the heart”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent acted with “serious misconduct and gross disregard of law” in the four complaints charged against him.

RULING:

For the obvious reason that all the facts involved in the first three complaints relate to matters of record in the proceedings in this Court in which respondent had been duly heard, no further administrative proceedings were held after respondent filed his answer.

In the first charge, the Court has, in a way, admonished the respondent, adding that they “should not lose the proper judicial perspective, and should see to it that in the execution of their sworn duties they do not overstep the limitations of their power as laid down by statute and by the rules of procedure”

With reference to the second and third charges of the Secretary, the Court had already reprimanded respondent for his offense for his refusal to “apply the law” as interpreted by the tribunal.

Anent the fourth charge, the report of the investigator is to the effect that the actuations of respondent complained of by Mrs. Olaes were not due to any improper or personal motive and were just the result of the innocuous eccentricities and odd ways and ideas of respondent which could not be categorized as serious misconduct nor deserving of any heavier sanction than admonition.

While the Court was awaiting said report, however, in a letter dated April 17, 1975, respondent informed the Court that His Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos had accepted his resignation effective January 11, 1974, “without prejudice to his receiving whatever rights he may be entitled to under the retirement and other existing laws.” Premises considered, and in line with the established policy regarding similar situations wherein the President has accepted resignations without prejudice to the grant of legally possible retirement benefits thus rendering administrative cases pending against the official concerned, moot and academic, the Court resolved to DISMISS the cases against respondent.

PEOPLE V. LICERA [65 S 270 (1975)]

FACTS:

In 1961, accused was granted an appointment as secret agent of Governor Leviste. In 1965, accused was charged with illegal possession of firearms. The SC held that where at the time of his appointment, People v. Macarandang (1959) was applicable, which held that secret agents were exempt from the license requirement, and later People v. Mapa (1967) was decided, the earlier case should be held applicable.


HELD: 

Art. 8 of the Civil Code decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions, although in them¬selves not law, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation placed by the courts upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect.
A new doctrine abrogating an old rule operates prospectively and should not adversely affect those favored by the old rule.

NAVARRO VS. DOMAGTOY (259 SCRA 129, July 19, 1996)

FACTS:

                Complainant Mayor Rodolfo Navarro of Dapa, Surigao del Norte filed this case to the Supreme Court against respondent Judge Henando Domagtoy of MCTC of Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte, for gross misconduct as well as inefficiency and ignorance of the law. 

                First, on Sept. 24, 1994, Judge Domagtoy solemnized the marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja despite his knowledge that Tagadan was merely separated from his wife.  Second, her performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario in October 1994 at respondent judge’s residence in Dapa, SDN.  As to the first, Domagtoy contended that he merely relied on the affidavit issued by the RTC Judge of Bassey, Samar, which stated that Tagadan and his wife have not seen each other for almost seven years.  However, the certified true copy of the marriage contract between Tagadan and Borja showed that his civil status was “separated”. 

ISSUE:

(1)     Whether or not a court may solemnize another marriage of a husband who was merely separated from his wife for almost seven years.

(2)     Whether or not a Judge may solemnize a marriage at his residence. 

HELD:

                (1) Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides that a marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.  In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient. 

                For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in the Code for the declaration of presumptive death.  Absent this judicial declaration, he remains to be married to Peñaranda.  Wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joind affidavit submitted by Tagadan.  Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous and therefore void marriage. 

                (2) Art. 7. A marriage may be solemnized by (1) any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction xxx .  Article 8, however, states that marriages shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Art. 29 of the Family Code, or where both parties in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect. 

                There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote place.  Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge is the “authority of the solemnizing officer”.  Under Art. 8, which is only a discretionary provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage. 

                Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdiction may officiate in marriages only within said areas and not beyond.  Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3 which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.               

                Judge Domagtoy was suspended for six months for demonstrating gross ignorance of the law.

copies of the certificates not later than fifteen (15) days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized.  Proper receipts shall be issued by the local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the marriage certificate.  The solemnizing officer shall retain in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate. 

                There is no justification for missing records save fortuitous events.  However, the records show that the loss was occasioned by carelessness on respondent Judge’s part.